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Re-thinking Aesthetics
Re-considering Philosophy and Aesthetics
T h e  th e m e  o f  this co n g ress , »A esthetics as Philosophy ,«  offers a rich  
o p p o rtu n ity  fo r reflection  o n  the m eanings and  uses o f  bo th  aesthetics and 
philosophy. W ith the challenge o f contem porary  developm ents in the arts 
and  the recognition o f the diversity and uniqueness of hum an cultures, many 
d iffe ren t in te rp re ta tio n s  will surely em erge in the days to follow. M oreover, 
the tim ing o f this congress a t the end o f the m illennium, while hardly a cosmic 
o ccu rren ce , still offers an  unusual opportun ity  for p ro found  reassessm ent 
o f b o th  aesthetics and  philosophy. I shall only begin a process h ere  th a t will 
surely co n tin u e  in the days th a t follow.
A esthetics is often  th o u g h t o f as one b ranch  o f philosophy, som etimes, 
indeed , a secondary  b ra n ch  o f  little significance for the broad  reaches o f 
p h ilo soph ic  th o u g h t. T his is som ew hat odd, since R ant, who is generally 
reg a rd ed  as a fo u n d in g  figure in m odern  philosophy, took the aesthetic as 
his epistem ological foundation  and  then developed a theory o f the aesthetic 
as th e  system atic u n ifie r o f knowledge and  morality. A nd at a gathering  of 
aestheticians from  all parts o f  the world, it requires little argum ent to dismiss 
the low re p u te  o f aesthetics and  acknowledge its philosophical significance. 
Because o f K ant’s eno rm ous historical im portance, however, it m aybe m ore 
difficult to reconsider his d om inan t influence on the discipline o f aesthetics. 
Yet th a t is precisely w hat I should  like to propose here. For what could be 
m o re  in keep ing  with b o th  the critical trad ition  o f philosophical though t 
a n d  the openness o f aesthetic  percep tion  than  to re-th ink the foundations 
o f  o u r discipline.
In  the sp irit o f  »aesthetics as philosophy,« then, I propose a radical re­
exam ination  o f the  foundations of m odern  aesthetics. This kind of explora­
tion is a t the  sam e tim e a p rofoundly  philosophical act, for philosophical 
prem ises lie a t the  very fou n d a tio n  o f m odern  aesthetics. Exploring these 
prem ises, in d eed  challenging  them , can lead us to a new basis for aesthetics 
derived  from  aesthetic inquiry  an d  n o t as an  a fte rthough t o f a philosophical 
trad itio n  whose origins w ere qu ite  in d ep en d en t o f the  aesthetic dom ain. 
Conversely, re-thinking aesthetics may suggest new ways o f doing philosophy.
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The Radical Critique o f Aesthetics
In recen t years aesthetics has h ad  som eth ing  o f a revival an d  is slowly 
em erging from  its philosophical eclipse. At the  sam e tim e, it has b een  the 
subject of serious criticism and fundam ental reconsideration. Let m e m ention  
two very d ifferen t examples.
In The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, Terry' Eagleton develops a politico-social 
critique o f aesthetics, placing it »at the h e a rt o f  the m idd le class’s struggle 
for political hegem ony.«1 Despite its p ro testations o f  autonom y, E agleton  
sees the aesthetic in its historical com plexity as a w indow in to  cu ltu ra l an d  
political changes. From  this perspective, the  very au tonom y claim ed for the 
ae s th e tic  serves a la rg e r  p o litica l p u rp o s e  as a m o d e l fo r  b o u rg e o is  
individualism , th a t is, o f its own claims to autonom y. T hus the  aesthe tic  is 
two-edged: It represents the political aspirations to self-determ ination o f the 
m id d le  class and  p rovides an  u n c o n s tra in e d  locus fo r  sen s ib ility  a n d  
im agination. At the same time, however, the  aesthetic  serves to in terna lize  
social power, rendering  it, th rough  its transform ation  in to  subjectivity, all 
the m ore effective a repressive fo rce .2 In  a la rg e r sense , th e n , aesth e tic  
au tonom y is specious, fo r the aesth e tic  is n o t a u to n o m o u s  a t all b u t  is 
harnessed to a larger, political, purpose. Perhaps this m igh t be called, with 
apologies to  Kant, p u rp o se  w ith o u t p u rp o siv en ess  -  a u ti li ta r ia n  goal 
m asquerading u n d e r the guise o f b e in g  self-contained.
U nlike E ag le to n ’s su b su m p tio n  o f aesthe tics u n d e r  h is to rica l a n d  
political purposes, W olfgang Welsch centers his critique on the  aesthetic , 
itself. H e finds tha t the aesthetic n o t only pervades the  whole o f  m o d ern  life 
b u t lies at th e  h ea rt o f philosophical though t. T h e  aesthetic concerns n o t 
ju st art b u t hum an culture en tout, and  it spreads o u t to inform  the very fabric 
o f m eaning, truth, and reality. Thus contem porary  aestheticization processes 
cover the surface of our world and  reach  beyond to shape social as well as 
m ateria l reality , affec ting  th e  fo rm  o f  in d iv id u a ls ’ ex is ten ce , o f  social 
in teraction , and  the very shape o f cu ltu re , itself.3 M ore provocative still is 
W elsch’s argum en t for epistem ological aesthetic ization , in  w hich » tru th , 
knowledge, and  reality have increasingly assum ed aesthetic  con tou rs.«4 All 
this leads h im  to an  »aesthetics b ey o n d  aesthe tics,«  w hich  takes th re e  
principal directions: expand ing  aesthetic  p e rcep tio n  to the  full ran g e  o f 
aisthesis, enlarging the range o f art to include both  the multiplicity o f its in n e r
1 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 3.
2 The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, pp. 23, 28.
3 Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 5-7.
4 Undoing Aesthetics, p. 23.
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aspects an d  d ie m any ways in  which art pervades the whole o f cu lture, and 
finally, ex ten d in g  aesthetics beyond art to society and the life-world.5
I find  these critiques o f aesthetics bo th  im portan t and  convincing. They 
h e ra ld  a new stage in philosophical developm ent, one th a t recognizes the 
fu n d am en ta l place o f  aesthetics in bo th  the criticism and  construction  of 
con tem porary  cu ltu re  an d  o f o u r very grasp o f reality. Yet for all their broad 
th rust, I believe tha t they d o  n o t go quite deep  enough. Eagleton encloses 
aesthetics in  its political an d  historical context, while Welsch expands the 
aesthetic  in to  a pow erful cu ltura l force. N either centers his critique on the 
aesthetic, itself.
Yet the aesthetic theory  they work with stands square in the cen te r of 
the very ph ilosoph ic trad ition  they question. And until the defects in this 
trad itio n  are exposed  an d  replaced, any critique o f aesthetics m erely snaps 
a t the heels o f a sluggish though still powerful beast. The dom ain o f aesthetics 
needs to be invaded by a T ro jan  horse, by a critique from  within the theory. 
In the pluralistic sp irit o f postm odernism , then , I believe that still m ore can 
be  said, an d  this from  the s tan d p o in t n o t of culture o r o f history b u t of the 
aesthetic  itself. T h e re  are artistic grounds for a critique o f aesthetics, and 
th e re  are ph ilosoph ical g rounds, as well. Above all, there  are experiential 
g rounds. N one o f these is in d ep en d en t o f historical and  cultural forces, bu t 
a t the  sam e tim e they ca n n o t be reduced  to these forces. T he critique of 
aesthetics m ust take place o n  m any levels and  in m any forms.
Difficulties in Traditional Aesthetics
W estern  aesthetics has been  form ed through two m ajor influences -  
first classical G reek, an d  then  E n ligh tenm ent thought, particularly as it was 
fo rm u la ted  by Kant. O f course, these are  closely related. Yet new strands of 
though t em erging  since the eighteenth  century suggest sharply d ifferent ways 
o f  conceiv ing  aesthetics. I f  I can characterize the d o m in an t trad ition  in 
aesthetics as K antian, w hat we need  to explore are the possibilities o f a non- 
Kan tian aesthetics or, b e tte r  yet, a post-Kantian aesthetics, and to consider 
the characteristics such a radically different aesthetics m ight display. I would 
like to take th e  occasion o f  this congress, and  its provocative them e, to 
exam ine som e o f these possibilities and to suggest a new and  different course 
th a t aesthetics m igh t follow.
T h e beg inn ings o f m ovem ent away from  Kant can be traced back to
Undoing Aesthetics, pp. 95-99.
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the m iddle o f the last century. W ith his p en e tra tin g  eye an d  d irectness o f 
expression, Nietzsche recognized the fundam ental difficulty with trad itional 
aesthetics: »Kant had  tho u g h t he was d o in g  a h o n o r to a rt w hen, am o n g  the 
predicates o f beauty, he gave p rom inence to those which flatter the intellect,
i.e., im personality and  universality.... Kant, like all ph ilosophers, in stead  o f 
viewing the esthetic issue from the side o f the artist, envisaged art an d  beauty 
solely from  the ‘spec ta to r’s’ po in t o f  view, an d  so, w ithou t h im self realizing 
it, sm uggled the ‘spectator’ into the co n cep t o f beauty.... [W ]e have go t from  
these philosophers of beauty definitions which, like K ant’s fam ous defin ition  
o f beauty, a re  m arred  by a com plete  lack o f es th e tic  sensibility. ‘T h a t is 
b e a u ti f u l ,’ K an t p ro c la im s , ‘w h ich  gives us d is in te re s te d  p le a s u r e . ’ 
Disinterested!«6
But it is no t only the artist for whom disinterestedness is no t appropriate. 
If the appreciato r abandons the objectifying, analytic stance o f th e  scholar 
or critic, the kind o f personal participation that he o r she engages in is closer 
to that o f the artist than  to the »ph ilosopher o f beauty« o f w hom  N ietzsche 
spoke so disparagingly. I like to call this active appreciative p artic ip a tio n  
»aesthetic engagem en t,«  for it b es t ch a rac te rizes  th e  k in d  o f  pow erfu l 
personal involvement that we have in o u r m ost fulfilled aesthetic experience. 
T h e re  a re  o th e r  reasons fo r w an tin g  to  d isca rd  th e  n o tio n  o f  d is in te ­
restedness. T he attitude it enjoins leads to d istancing  the  a rt o b jec t an d  to 
circum scribing it with clear boundaries tha t isolate it from  the re s t o f  the 
hu m an  w orld. In  the e ig h teen th  cen tu ry  w hen th e  fine  arts w ere b e in g  
identified, separated  from  the o th er arts, an d  given a distinctive status, an 
aesth e tic s  th a t  in s titu tio n a liz e d  th is  p ro cess  a n d  c o n fe r re d  a sp ec ia l 
p rom inence on those arts had  its value. W ith w idespread  accep tance o f the 
identity and im portance of the arts, such a need  no longer exists. To eternalize 
an idea whose significance is now largely historical b o th  exaggerates its place 
and  h inders aesthetic inquiry. And it m isdirects an d  obstructs appreciative 
experience.7
D isinterestedness is n o t the only o n e  o f K an t’s bequests th a t can be  
challenged. E ighteenth  century  aesthetics is very m uch  a p ro d u c t o f  the  
th ink ing  o f  the  times. It p laces in  full view b o th  its re lian ce  o n  facu lty  
psychology an d  the essentializing a n d  un iversa liz ing  p h ilo so p h y  o f  th e  
E n ligh tenm en t. F u rth erm o re , it im poses a scientific m odel o n  aesth e tic  
understand ing , a m odel th a t p roceeds by objectifica tion , d issection , an d  
analysis. T hus the conceptual structu re  th a t we have in h e rited  from  K ant
*’ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, T hird  Essay, 6.
7 I have developed a constructive critique of disin terestedness in »Beyond D isinte­
restedness,« British Journal of Aesthetics, 34 /3  (July 1994).
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iden tifies d istinc t an d  separate  m odalities o f percep tion  and  conception, 
beg inn ing  with that famous distinction itself. To separate percept and concept 
p roduces a p rob lem  som e aestheticians continue to g rapp le with: the place 
o f  k n o w led g e  in  th e  p e rc e p tu a l  e x p e r ie n c e  o f a r t.  T h e re  a re  o th e r  
p rob lem atic  oppositions in the  eigh teen th  century aesthetic, such as those 
b e tw e e n  sen se  a n d  re a s o n , in te re s t  a n d  d is in te re s t , a n d  illu s io n  o r  
im ag ination  an d  reality. In the con tex t of E nligh tenm ent rationalism , these 
d istinc tions were illu m in atin g  and liberating. Today they provide a false 
clarity an d  a deceptive o rd e r, and  they en th ra ll b o th  u n d erstan d in g  and 
experience . Serious questions can be raised about w hether we can speak 
e ith e r o f  reason  o r o f sense w ithout the one including the o ther, questions 
s u p p o r te d  b o th  by p sy ch o lo g ica l re s e a rc h  an d  la te r  p h ilo so p h ic a l 
developm ents. Similarly, the purity o f disinterestedness is difficult to defend, 
especially as b o th  th e  m otivation and  the consum ption  o f art have been  
absorbed  in to  the  com m odification of culture.8 A nd the theoretical force of 
existential phenom enology, herm eneutics, deconstruction, and philosophical 
pragm atism  have u n d erm in ed  claims to objectivity, the reduction  of complex 
wholes to sim ple constituen ts, and  the hegem ony of scientific cognition.
We n eed  d iffe ren t theoretical tools for cap turing  the special character 
o f aesth e tic  ap p rec ia tio n , special even though  it n eed  n o t be un ique or 
u n co n n e c ted  with o th e r dom ains o f hum an  culture. F urtherm ore , what is 
especially striking abou t bo th  the intellectual and technological developments 
o f o u r own tim e is the ex ten t to which the notion o f reality has been enlarged 
and  m ultip lied . H erm eneu tics and  deconstruction  have provided grounds 
for coexisten t in terp re ta tions, and  these have generated  a plurality o f truths. 
F ro m  a d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t io n ,  p h ilo so p h ic a l  p ra g m a tism  a n d  re la te d  
approaches, such as B u ch ler’s princip le of ontological parity, have laid the 
th e o re tic a l  g ro u n d s  fo r a m etaphysics o f  m u ltip le  rea litie s .9 T h e  very 
o b jec tiv ity  o f  b o th  h is to ry  a n d  sc ience  has b een  u n d e rm in e d  by o u r 
reco g n itio n  o f the constitutive influence o f social, cultural, and  historical 
forces, an d  this has b eg u n  to be codified in the social sciences. Finally, 
con tem porary  industrial societies inhabit the virtual world o f film, television,
8 I have developed a critique of Kantian aesthetics in »The Historicity o f Aesthetics I,« 
The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1986), 101-111; »The Historicity of 
Aesthetics II,« The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sum m er 1986), 195-203.
{J See, in particular, William Jam es, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Lincoln and London: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1996) ; William jam es, A Pluralistic Universe (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); andjustus Buchler, Metaphysics of Natural 
Complexes (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1966). 2nd edition (State University 
of New York Press, 1990). I have carried aesthetic theory in a similar direction in Art 
and Engagement, (Philadelphia: Tem ple University Press, 1991).
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and cyberspace, »media-reality,« as W elsch calls it,10 a reality we have created  
that, ironically enough , strangely resem bles the A frican B u sh m en ’s be lie f 
in creation as a dream  dream ing us.11
O ne o f the lessons o f post-m odernism , a lesson post-m odern ism  did  
n o t inven t, is th a t cu ltu ra l trad itio n s  a n d  social in flu en c es  s h a p e  o u r  
percep tual experience so thoroughly  th a t th e re  is no  such th in g  as p u re  
perception , and  tha t to discuss it, even as a theo re tical category, is greatly 
m isleading. But Kantian aesthetics is bu ilt u p o n  the  concep tual s tru c tu re  o f 
eighteenth century psychology that considers reason, sense, im agination, and  
feeling as faculties o f  the m ind. Form ed in the in te re st o f  ra tionaliz ing  an d  
universalizing  know ledge, these vastly sim plify th e  co m p lex  co n tex tu a l 
character o f h um an  experience. To take them  separately an d  trea t th em  as 
distinct and  independen t faculties o r  capacities creates divisions that we then  
are faced with reconciling. T hink  o f the vast am o u n t o f a tten tio n  devoted  to 
defend ing  im agination against reason, isolating u n iq u e  aesthetic  qualities, 
and  reconciling  expression with form.
T he conclusion to which all this leads, w h e th e r o r  n o t it is com fortab le  
or desirable, is inescapable. T he idea o f a ra tional universe, o f  an  objective, 
systematic o rder, m ust be re legated  to a display case in a m useum  o f  the 
history o f ideas. Philosophy has construc ted  opposing  forces th a t it is th en  
faced with reconciling, a contrived process th a t is rarely successful. We n eed  
to re-think these ideas, n o t with the in te n t o f clarifying them  by sh arp en in g  
their differences, b u t exactly the opposite -  by showing their in terpenetration , 
their continuity, and  a t times even th e ir fusion, perh ap s with the h o p e  o f 
achieving a kind o f Spinozistic unity th a t sees them  as aspects o f  a com m on 
substance.
A New Direction for Aesthetics
W hat is left o f aesthetics if we tu rn  away from  the  K antian  tradition? 
W hat would a new aesthetics, a post-Kantian aesthetic, look like? If we discard 
the categories o f faculty psychology -  sense, im agination , feeling, m em ory, 
reason, taste; if we forego the classical th ru st o f ph ilosophy to universalize 
and  dismiss the puzzles over em otion , expression, rep resen ta tio n , an d  the 
like that arise from the fragm entation o f the world o f art in to  spectator, artist, 
and work o f art; what then  is left? If we literally re-th ink  aesthetics, w hat k ind  
o f intellectual creation  will em erge, w hat k ind  o f  c rea tu re  will b e  born?
10 Welsch, op. cit., p. 86.
11 Lawrence van der Post, The Lost World of the Kalahari (New York: H arcourt Brace, 1977).
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L et m e take this occasion to suggest a program  for the different sort o f 
th in k in g  th a t I believe m ust guide o u r inquiry in aesthetics in a new and  
d iffe ren t direction:
1. R elinquish the  substantive categories we have inherited  from eighteenth  
cen tury  psychology and  replace them  with adjectival and  adverbial forms 
o f such p h en o m en a . ‘Sensation’ then  becom es ‘sensory,’ ‘percep tio n ’ 
becom es ‘p e rcep tu a l,’ ‘cogn ition ’ ‘cognitive,’ etc.
2. R eplace universalization with a pluralistic account and  explore to what 
ex ten t th e re  are certa in  com m on p h en o m en a  th a t appear in d ifferent 
artistic an d  aesthetic  cultures. From  this we can learn  what degrees of 
g e n e ra l i ty  can  b e  d is c e rn e d  a n d  w h e th e r  th e se  a re  h e lp fu l an d  
i llu m in a tin g  o r, o n  th e  co n tra ry , w h e th e r  they  o b scu re  im p o rta n t 
d ifferences th a t req u ire  recognition.
3. R ela ted  to this, give a p rim ary  place to varying cu ltu ra l trad itions in 
aesthetics, and  to the ongoing  histories o f thought and  o f experience that 
they reflect. N ot only do  the d ifferen t arts have their own histories; they 
a re  in te r r e la te d  in  d if fe re n t  ways in  d if fe re n t c u ltu ra l trad itio n s . 
E xam ining these will n o t only encourage a degree o f hum ility in both  
th e  sch o la r a n d  the  ap p rec ia to r; a t the  sam e tim e it will en rich  o u r 
capacities for aesthetic  percep tion  and  enlarge its range and  content.
4. Resist the  tendency  o f essentialist th inking to identify single forces and 
factors to illum inate the aesthetic process, such as em otion, expression, 
o r  m e a n in g , a n d  lo o k  in s tead  fo r co m p lex ities , fo r  ch a rac te ris tic  
g ro u p in g s o f  in flu en ces , fo r in te rre la tio n sh ip s , fo r ap p ro p ria te  and  
varying contexts.
5. C onsider aesthetics n o t as the special dom ain o f a value sharply distinct 
from  o th e r kinds o f values, including m oral, practical, social, and political 
ones, b u t look for the special con tribu tion  aesthetic value can make to 
the norm ative com plexity  that pervades and  is inseparable from  every 
reg ion  o f the h u m an  realm . Aesthetic value can be distinctive w ithout 
b e in g  sep a ra te , un iq u ely  valuable w ithou t being  singular, im p o rtan t 
w ithout being  pure , and  occupy a critical place in hum an  culture w ithout 
b e in g  isolated.
6. Develop the g rounds for an  aesthetic-based criticism, n o t only o f the arts 
b u t  o f  c u l tu re  a n d  k n o w led g e , fo r th ese  too have th e ir  a e s th e tic  
d im ensions. Such criticism  should be d irected  n o t only at their con ten t 
bu t, even m ore  im p o rtan t, toward their presuppositions.
N ow here is criticism  m ore needed , however, than o f aesthetic theory 
itself. F o r p h ilo so p h ic a l in fluences on theo ry  have com e, n o t from  an 
investigation o f aesthetic  sensibility, b u t largely from  the  ontological and
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epistemological framework o f the W estern philosophical tradition  tha t moves 
from classical sources, through its appropria tion  by E n lig h ten m en t thinkers, 
into the present. It is a tradition  tha t has ex tolled  contem plative reason  and  
has been  suspicious o f the body and  the  full range o f h u m an  sensibility. As 
a c o n se q u en ce , we are  p re s e n te d  w ith  an  a rray  o f  issues th a t  have a 
philosophical ra ther than  an aesthetic source. A m ong these we can cite such 
divisive oppositions as those betw een surface (as in  aesthetic qualities) and  
substance, form  and  conten t, illusion an d  reality, spec ta to r an d  w ork o f  a rt 
( th a t is, sub ject an d  ob ject), an d  b eau ty  a n d  use ( th a t  is, in tr in s ic  an d  
instrum ental values). These have assum ed onto logical status an d  m isd irect 
aesthetic inquiry in a fragm entary an d  oppositional d irec tion . All o f  these 
derive from  the u n d u e  influence of this ph ilosophical trad ition  on  aesthetic 
theory, in particu lar from  its cognitive m odel.
Aesthetic Engagement, an Aesthetics of Context and Continuity
My own view favors a pluralistic aesthetic tha t allows for the fullest range 
o f creative m aking in all the h u m an  arts an d  in all th e ir  diverse cu ltu ra l 
m anifestations. We need  no t be so co n cern ed  with h ierarchy, with invidious 
rankings, b u t ra ther with studying how these arts function  in  society an d  in 
e x p e rie n c e  -  w ha t n eed s  they  fu lfill, w h a t p u rp o se s  th ey  serve, w h a t 
satisfactions they offer, and  how they ex ten d  h u m an  capacities to perceive 
and understand . Such an aesthetic, m oreover, ex tends beyond  the  arts to 
th e  w orld  in  w hich  we live, to th e  n a tu ra l  e n v iro n m e n t,  to  th e  b u il t  
environm ent, to com m unity, to personal relations. T hese, neg lec ted  un til 
recently, beg  for scholarly and  scientific a tten tio n  so th a t they can ad d  n o t 
only to th e  range o f know ledge b u t so th a t they  can  clarify an d  en la rg e  
regions o f  experience often u n a tten d e d  to and  h id d en .
Such an  aesthetic sensibility, o n e  th a t recognizes its in teg ra tio n  in  the  
life o f hum an cultures, is an aesthetics o f contex t and  continuity. N ot set apart 
in grand  b u t lonely isolation, the aesthetic dom ain  o f experience infuses the 
many and  varied activities in which we engage, from  daily tasks to p o p u la r 
culture. It also retains its significance for those arts th a t focus on  an d  distill 
the m ost in tense and  p ro fo u n d  m om ents o f experience , the  so-called fine 
arts. B ut these, too, in fluence an d  e n te r  in to  th e  w ide ran g e  o f  h u m a n  
experience. We m ust su rren d er the m yth o f  purity  a lo n g  with the m yth o f  
exclusivity.
I call this »aesthetic engagem ent,« for it n o t only recognizes and  extends 
the connections o f aesthetic experience b u t invites o u r  total involvem ent as
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active partic ipants. A esthetic engagem en t is m ore a descriptive theory than  
a prescriptive one: It reflects the activity o f the artist, the perform er, and  
the  ap p rec ia to r as these com bine in aesthetic experience. And it is a theory 
th a t  reflects th e  w orld  we p a rtic ip a te  in, n o t the illusory  sp len d o r o f  a 
p h ilosoph ical fantasy.
* * *
I realize th a t these are iconoclastic proposals and th a t they challenge 
m any o f the strongest supports and  firm est convictions o f m odern  aesthetics. 
B ut w he ther or n o t you agree with m e, I h o p e  you will take these proposals 
as an  incentive to reconsider the axioms o f aesthetics, and  work to shape 
th e o ry  to  th e  facts o f  a r t  a n d  ex p e rie n c e . T o  b eg in  th is p ro cess , n o  
o p p o rtu n ity  is b e tte r  th an  these days in Ljubljana. Bonne chance!v2
121 have developed aspects o f this critique in many places. These include: Living in the 
Landscape: Toward an Aesthetics of Environment (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1997); The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Springfield, 111.: C. C. 
Thom as, 1970); in Art and Engagement, and in a num ber of recent papers.

